South Carolina Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 4

Fall 1985

Bankruptcy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1985) "Bankruptcy," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 37 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

et al.: Bankruptcy

BANKRUPTCY
SURVIVAL OF PREBANKRUPTCY JUDGMENT LIENS

In Ducker v. Standard Supply Co." the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to interpret a state statute
in a manner that would enlarge the scope of relief granted the
bankrupt in his bankruptcy discharge beyond that which is
available under federal bankruptcy law. The court ruled that the
discharge of judgment debts one year after bankruptcy proceed-2
ings, allowed to a judgment debtor under South Carolina law,
does not invalidate judgment liens that were vested in the judgment creditor before the filing of the debtor's petition in bankruptcy.3 This opinion reaffirmed a rule of law in South Carolina
that had not come before the court in three quarters of a century.4 The decision is in accord with most jurisdictions 5 and be-

1. 280 S.C. 157, 311 S.E.2d 728 (1984).
2. Section 15-35-630 of the South Carolina Code states:
Any time after one year has elapsed since a bankrupt was discharged from
his debts, pursuant to the acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy, the bankrupt, his receiver, trustee or any other interested person may apply, upon proof
of the bankrupt's discharge, to the court in which a judgment was rendered
against him or, if rendered in a court not of record, to the court of which it has
become a judgment by docketing it therein for an order directing the judgment
to be cancelled and discharged of record. If it appears upon the hearing that
the bankrupt has been discharged from the payment of that judgment or the
debt upon which such judgment was recovered, an order must be made directing the judgment to be cancelled and discharged of record. And thereupon
the clerk of the court shall cancel and discharge the judgment by marking on
the docket thereof that it is cancelled and discharged by order of the court,
giving the date of entry of the order of discharge.
The provisions of this section shall not operate to discharge any debt,
judgment or claim that is not dischargeable under the Federal Bankruptcy Act
or the law of this State.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-35-630 (1976).
3. 280 S.C. at 159, 311 S.E.2d at 730.
4. The Ducker opinion cites Wagner & Co. v. Brown Bros., 82 S.C. 131, 62 S.E. 513
(1909), to support the rule, and no other decision on this issue has been written since
that time. Several 19th century opinions support the concept that judgment liens survive
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Daniels v. Moses, 12 S.C. 130, 138 (1879)(proceeding
for the enforcement of a lien upon land in the possession of A, which demands no personal judgment against him, is not affected by a subsequent adjudication of bankruptcy
against him); Bain v. Stern, 1 S.C. 415, 419 (1869).
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cause it is not particularly novel, should have little effect on the
South Carolina practitioner. Attorneys, however, should be
aware of Ducker in order to avoid mistakes concerning judgment
liens and their holders that may arise because of confusion over
the distinction between judgment liens and judgment debts.'
Further, the Ducker decision, in answering a relatively simple
question, brings to light problems that may be subject to dispute
in the future.
The Ducker case entailed a sequence of events that began
when the respondents, Addison Products Co., Southern Bank
and Trust Co., and Standard Supply Co., 7 each independently

obtained judgments against Emily Gaye B. Ducker. These judgments were duly recorded and indexed in the office of the
Beaufort County Clerk of Court. At the time these judgments
were filed, Ducker owned real property in Beaufort County.8
Ducker filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition on May 7,
1975, listing her judgment debts to respondents. Her discharge
in bankruptcy was granted on June 26, 1975. Ducker retained
title to the real property to which the judgment liens were attached and subsequently sold that property.9
In September 1980 Ducker commenced an action seeking
the cancellation and discharge of record of the judgments held
5. Little support is found for the proposition that a judgment lien acquired prior to
bankruptcy may be discharged as a debt of the judgment debtor that does not have to be
paid. See 9 AM. Jun. 2D Bankruptcy § 267 (1980)("The right to retain an existing lien
until the debt secured thereby is paid is a substantive property right which may not be
taken from the creditor except in a manner consistent with the Constitution.") See also
9 Am. Jun. 2D Bankruptcy §§ 270, 779 (1980).
6. The Ducker case clearly resolves the issue of whether or not preexisting judgment
liens survive bankruptcy proceedings. These liens clearly do survive both the proceedings
and a discharge under § 13-35-630. Therefore, attorneys should be wary of mistakenly
advising judgment debtors that a discharge under § 15-35-630 will invalidate all debts to
a judgment creditor if there is a valid prebankruptcy judgment lien, or of advising judgment creditors that a discharge under § 15-35-630 has invalidated any prebankruptcy
liens that they hold.
7. 280 S.C. at 158, 311 S.E.2d at 729. Although each of the respondents had an
outstanding judgment lien against Ducker, only Addison stood to gain a significant financial benefit from the outstanding liens. Thus, Addison became the dominant force behind the respondents and was the respondent of record before the South Carolina Supreme Court.
8. Record at 5-6. See also Brief for Respondent Addison Products Co. at 1.
9. Record at 5. See also Brief for Respondent Addison Products Co. at 1. It is unclear why the trustee did not liquidate this real estate, subject to liens as it was, but
perhaps the trustee simply abandoned the property because there was no equity in it.
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by respondents. 10 The action was filed pursuant to section 15-35630 of the South Carolina Code, which authorizes a debtor to
apply for an order to cancel and discharge outstanding judgments at any time after one year since the debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy. 1
The trial court ruled that the discharge in bankruptcy was a
determination of Ducker's personal liability. Further, any judgment liens upon real property acquired after the date of the
original bankruptcy petition were similarly discharged. The trial
court ruled, however, that respondents' judgment liens, established before bankruptcy upon property retained after the bankruptcy, were not discharged, but retained their validity.' 2 The
South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this
decision.
The court pointed out that section 15-35-630 does not provide for the discharge of any debt, judgment, or claim not already dischargeable under either federal bankruptcy law or
South Carolina law.' 3 Thus, the Discharge in Bankruptcy Order
filed in the United States District Court released Mrs. Ducker
only from her personal liability on any judgment obtained in any
court before the discharge. 4 The court then cited Wagner & Co.
v. Brown Bros.'5 in support of the proposition that a discharge
of the personal liability of a judgment debtor does not affect
liens securing the judgment debts.' 6 The court also noted that
several other jurisdictions have held that similar statutes did not
affect judgment liens that attached to the judgment debtor's real
property prior to the commencement
of bankruptcy
7
proceedings.'
The reasoning behind the Ducker opinion appears to be
sound. The goal of statutes such as section 15-35-630 is to clear

10. Record at 5. See also Brief for Respondent Addison Products Co. at 1; 280 S.C.
at 158, 311 S.E.2d at 729.
11. For text of statute, see supra note 2.
12. Record at 6-7; 280 S.C. at 159, 311 S.E.2d at 730.
13. 280 S.C. at 159, 311 S.E.2d at 730.
14. Id. at 159, 311 S.E.2d at 729.
15. 82 S.C. 140 (1909), denying reh'g of 82 S.C. 131, 62 S.E. 513 (1908).
16. 280 S.C. at 159, 311 S.E.2d at 730.
17. The court in Ducker cited Albritton v. General Portland Cement Co., 344 So. 2d
574 (Fla. 1977); Olsen v. Nelson, 125 Minn. 286, 146 N.W. 1097 (1914); John Leslie Paper
Co. v. Wheeler, 23 N.D. 477, 137 N.W. 412 (1912); Bush v. Shepard, 186 Or. 105, 205
P.2d 842 (1949). Each of these cases is factually similar to Ducker.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1985

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art.
4
[Vol.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

37

the record after the bankruptcy and to keep prebankruptcy liens
from attaching to property acquired after bankruptcy."' Judgment liens acquired prior to bankruptcy proceedings are property rights that have vested in the creditor.' 9 Courts have consistently upheld the right of the judgment creditor to enforce
these liens.2 0
There is one further aspect of the relationship between
bankruptcy proceedings and judgment liens that is worthy of
mention. There exists the possibility that liens that are valueless
at the time of bankruptcy, because of superior creditor interests
or valid homestead exemptions, 21 could become more valuable as
property values increase and owners build their equity in the
property. In Everett v. Page Brothers the Oregon Supreme
Court ruled that such a benefit to creditors was valid.22 In the
interest of transferability of property, however, the Oregon legislature subsequently established procedures through which judg23
ment debtors could void liens that secure no actual interest.
Although other states have been slow to deal with this situation,
the United States Congress seems to have addressed the
problem.
In amending section 506 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,2 4

18, 344 So. 2d at 576.
19, 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy §§ 267, 270, 779 (1980).
20, For authorities, see supra note 17. See also 9 AMi. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy §§ 267,
779 (1980). The following three constitutional arguments might be applicable to protect
the validity of prebankruptcy liens from discharge: (1) the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law; (2) the prohibition against ex post facto
laws; and (3) the prohibition against the impairment of the obligations of contracts. See
344 So. 2d at 575-76.
21. Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien or an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this exception if such lien is(1) a judicial lien. ...
11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1978), Section 522(b) provides that
an individual debtor may exempt from the property of the estate...
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under.

.

. State or local law. ...

Id. § 522(b). S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-200(1)(1976) exempts homesteads of debtors up to

the value of $5,000.
22. See Everett v. Page, 269 Or. 575, 525 P.2d 996 (1974).
23. ORRaV. STAT. § 23.280 (1975). See also Credit Serv. Co. v. Cameron, 41 Or.
App. 57, 597 P.2d 363 (1979).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1978).
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Congress provided that to the extent that judgment liens secure
claims against the debtor that are not allowed secured claims,
the lien is void unless the sole reason it is not an allowed secured
claim is improper filing. 5 Formerly, such liens were void only if
a party in interest requested a determinination of the lien's validity.s6 An allowed secured claim created by a judgment lien exists to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the
debtor's interest in the property.27 In other words, a creditor has
an allowed secured claim only to the extent to which the value of
the property securing the debt exceeds the interests of prior
creditors. The balance of such a claim is treated as an unsecured
claim. This change affects all cases filed more than 90 days after
July 10, 1984.8 Congress thus seems to have precluded judgment creditors from sitting on their rights while their liens accrue in value after a bankrupt debtor has taken appropriate
steps to clear up his financial record. The recovery against a
debtor now seems to be limited to the value of the lien at the
time of the ruling of the bankruptcy court, regardless of any ensuing increase in either the judgment debtor's equity or the
value of the property.2 9 While this interpretation seems logical,
the courts may read the new version of the statute differently.
It is important that practitioners be familiar with both
Ducker v. Addison Products and section 15-36-630. In representing judgment debtors and judgment creditors, attorneys
should realize that default judgments under section 15-36-630
may not discharge valid prebankruptcy judgment liens. Further,
attorneys for judgment debtors may find section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code useful in protecting the debtors postbankruptcy increases in property value from lienholders' efforts to
enforce those prebankruptcy liens.
Frank L. Eppes

25. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353 § 448, 98 Stat. 333, 374.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(1978).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1978).
28. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 333, 392.
29. Id.
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